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I. Introduction 
Euthanasia has been in the forefront of the media in recent years because of the increased 
attention it is receiving in government proceedings. The discussion over whether euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide should be legalized is a major topic of debate in legal circles as well as 
medical ethics. As medical technology advances and our ability to control our medical treatments 
increases to the point of extending our lives, it becomes more evident that we should also have 
some control over our deaths, as well. Hence the push for legalization of euthanasia has grown 
with emergent technological advances. But an important question to ask is whether or not 
euthanasia is morally permissible for both the physician and the patient. In what follows, I will 
investigate the important aspects of euthanasia and propose that, in at least some cases, 
euthanasia in the medical profession is not only permissible, but an acceptable practice.  
 First, some clarification on the topic of euthanasia is needed before any discussion can 
continue. There are many definitions and categories of euthanasia in the medical world: 
voluntary, non-voluntary, involuntary and active or passive. For the purposes of this paper, I am 
limiting the discussion to only ideas of euthanasia that are voluntary and, in particular, those that 
are active acts. While most of the discussion will also apply to passive acts in which treatment or 
life sustaining acts are withdrawn, these will not be the focus here. The importance of only 
considering voluntary acts regulates all considerations to those in which the patient gave their 
consent for euthanasia and was not forced or coerced into it.   
 It is also important to distinguish the difference between voluntary, active euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide. While these are related terms there are some key differences that must 
be noted. As pointed out by Dan Brock in Voluntary Active Euthanasia, one main difference 
between the two is who acts last. In acts of euthanasia, it is the physician who acts last as they 
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administer the lethal dose. On the other hand, in physician-assisted suicides, the patient is the one 
who acts last in administering the lethal dose themselves. (Brock, p10) Because of this distinct 
difference in the two cases, it can often be difficult to discuss both in the same context. However, 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide have one similarity that places them on common 
ground: the physician plays a major role in the death of the patient, whether actively 
administering the drug or prescribing the drug. When discussing these cases, it is important to 
keep this similarity in mind because, despite their differences, the two occurrences are related. 
Thus, in the course of this paper, all mention of euthanasia will be inclusive of acts of physician-
assisted suicides as well. 
 Now that the details of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide have been clarified, it 
must be discussed why these acts are permissible. The need for control is a very real concern in 
the lives of most individuals. We want to die with dignity and control the details of when/how 
we leave the world. Euthanasia provides the control that is desired by the patients during end of 
life decisions. With the proper regulations and requirements, euthanasia provides an alternative 
for patients at the end of their life. What needs to be decided, though, is whether or not there is a 
strong case for the permissibility of euthanasia based its consequences, both positive and 
negative. This can be done by not only looking at the consequences of euthanasia, but also 
looking at established areas with legalized euthanasia such as Oregon.  
 Dan Brock points out four important positive consequences of euthanasia which appear 
very relevant to this discussion. The first of these is interesting in nature. As mentioned earlier, 
Americans have a desire to control every part of life, including the end of it. Because of this 
desire, most people feel that we have a right to obtain euthanasia if it is wanted. However, 
interestingly, the majority of people who support the right to euthanasia will never seek it. It is 
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simply the reassurance that euthanasia is available if they desire it that is sought. (Brock 15) 
Thus, the permissibility of euthanasia, without the need to even obtain it, is a benefit in itself 
because of the reassurance it provides to the majority of the population.  
 The second positive consequence of euthanasia is very common when dealing with end 
of life situations that are not pleasant. For many patients, the end of life experience is actually 
agonizing and uncomfortable. Aside from the fact that the situation is scary, this time is often 
filled with extreme pain and suffering. Frequently, though, this pain and suffering does not mean 
a hasty or easy death, and for patients who are receiving no life sustaining treatment, euthanasia 
may be the only option to relieve them of their suffering. This is commonly called the argument 
from mercy because it appeals to our feeling of sympathy for those in pain and our desire to help 
them in some way. This is also why it is often the strongest argument presented for euthanasia. 
(Brock 15) However, pain and suffering seem to be very arbitrary methods of measurements. 
Obviously, there is difference between pain that is treatable or manageable and pain that is too 
extreme to be controlled. It is the latter type of pain that qualifies for euthanasia discussions most 
often because once it reaches an uncontrollable point, there is little that can be done. Cases in 
which all options for managing pain have been exhausted and none found successful or 
beneficial seem to lean in favor of euthanasia because of the lack of viable options.   
 This leads to the third positive consequence of legalized euthanasia. Once a patient 
reaches a point where death is accepted, the humane decision seems to be euthanasia. This 
provides a death that is more peaceful and quick than the any other option, especially one that 
involves prolonging life needlessly. At this point in a patient’s life, often it is important to them 
to regain some of the control that has been lost and preserve their dignity by dying in a way that 
they feel is acceptable. It is because we care about the way people remember us that we want to 
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make our death as dignified as possible. Thus, euthanasia seems to provide a method for dying 
with dignity and control rather than one of prolonged pain and suffering.  
 A final positive consequence is one that is very important for individuals. If euthanasia 
were permissible, the autonomy of competent, well-informed patients would be respected in 
every respect. The number of people who currently desire euthanasia but cannot obtain it is hard 
to determine. However, by looking at the established methods of legal euthanasia upheld in the 
state of Oregon, we can get a picture of how euthanasia works legally.  
 Oregon has had laws legalizing euthanasia for over 20 years. Within their established 
system, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (DWDA) allows physicians to prescribe lethal doses 
of medication to patients who request physician-assisted suicide. Currently, the drug most 
commonly prescribed to patients for this purpose is an oral dose of a synthetic drug known as a 
barbiturate such as secobarbital. Barbiturates are synthesized from barbituric acid which is 
pharmaceutically inactive compound. However, by adjusting the substituents attached to this 
parent compound, prescription secobarbital can be produced. A look into the chemical aspects of 
these prescription drugs can show how they allow the positive consequences mentioned above to 
be put into practice in actual situations. (“Frequently Asked Questions”, 2015) In their traditional 
use, these drugs are used as sedatives or “sleeping pills”. Because secobarbital is highly soluble 
in lipids but only slightly soluble in water, along with its other chemical properties, 
(“Secobarbital”, 2005) once the lethal dose has been administered, the drug is absorbed into the 
body and “rapidly distributed to all tissues and fluids” which allows the effects to be felt shortly 
after. (“Pharmaceutical Information”, 2015) (For more information of the chemical nature of 
barbiturates, and secobarbital in particular, see Appendix A.)Thus, when used within the DWDA 
barbiturates can be used to sedate a patient before their death, which is assumed to alleviate any 
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pain or suffering, they may feel. This means that the patient will be quickly and calmly sedated, 
often into a comatose state, before the lethal affects occur. This in turn eases the overall suffering 
experienced during this time.  
However, the requirements for obtaining these prescription drugs and euthanasia in 
general, are rigorous and meant to confirm the patient’s decisions concerning the end of their 
lives. Thus, before euthanasia is agreed upon, the patient must be declared terminally ill with less 
than six months to live. They also must submit three requests for euthanasia to a physician, one 
written and two oral, each at least fifteen days apart. According to the Oregon Public Health 
Division, since the law was passed in 1997, a total of 859 patients have died from ingesting 
medication legally prescribed, while a total of 1,327 people have been prescribed lethal doses of 
medication. This number has steadily increased each year since the passing of the law. (Oregon, 
2015) This is indicative of a trend in the population that suggests euthanasia is becoming more 
accepted and requested.  
However, not everyone agrees with this proposition that euthanasia should be 
permissible. In order to thoroughly discuss the idea of euthanasia, we must not only look at 
proponents of it but also those who are adamantly opposed to its practice as well. Leon Kass is 
one such opponent. In his paper Neither for Love nor Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill, he 
lays out his argument against euthanasia from the point of view that euthanasia is contrary to a 
physician’s central role. (38-39) Kass states that the central role of physicians, and the essence of 
medicine in general, is to heal and not to kill. It is more than just their job; it is the goal 
physicians strive to achieve. According to Kass, “A person can choose to be a physician, but he 
cannot choose what physicianship means.” (38) Thus, euthanasia is impermissible, not because 
the patients do not have a right to it, but because it violates the central role of the physicians. 
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(Kass 37-39) However, in his definition of healing, Kass seems to accept a very limited view of 
what ‘healing’ is. The traditional view of healing is to make well and whole. Thus, a physician’s 
job is to take someone who is sick or unhealthy and make them well again. This raises an issue 
when medical technology and methods run out. What role do physicians play when there is 
nothing left for them to do? When no ‘healing’ can occur?  
 It seems that there are parts of a physician’s job that extend outside of the traditional 
measures of healing and that their relationship with the patients is more complex than a 
consumer model would suggest. In fact, it appears that Brock would agree with this. He states 
that “Killing patients is not understood to be part of physicians’ job description, but some 
killings are ethically justified, including many instances of stopping life support.” (Brock 13) In 
these cases, when no traditional healing can occur, I think it necessary that a new definition of 
‘healing’ is found, or at least the current one modified, to include instances in which justified 
killing occurs. This would mean that, in order to properly define the role of a physician, 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide become permissible under this newly defined role of 
physicians. Thus, it does not appear that Kass’ opposition to euthanasia, at least from this point, 
is substantial enough to cause significant problems.  
However, he continues by discussing some additional reasons he considers euthanasia 
impermissible. Kass claims that, in addition to defeating the role of the physician, allowing 
euthanasia would have adverse effects on the physician. He states that if physicians were 
permitted to assist in cases of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicides, it would make it hard 
for them to perform their jobs. In his words, physicians need “protection against himself and his 
weaknesses.” (Kass 35) If euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide were made legal, physicians, 
in Kass’ opinion, would be too tempted to misuse their power and fall prey to their own 
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weaknesses.  Kass uses the example of his acquaintance, who worked in hospice, to make this 
point, quoting: “Only because I knew that I could not and would not kill my patients was I able 
to enter most fully and intimately into caring for them as they lay dying.” (Kass 35) However, it 
is important to note that in this case, as with many other cases, the physician cannot kill their 
patients (as least legally) but they also would not want to. Kass seems to underestimate the 
willpower and professionalism of physicians. While there is always the chance that a physician 
could misuse their power, it is also a possibility that physicians could do the same thing without 
legalization of euthanasia.  
Kass continues on page 35 by stating that if euthanasia were allowed it would damage the 
physician-patient relationship. This, Kass claims, is because the patients trust in the physician 
would be completely lost. How is a patient supposed to trust that a physician has their best 
interest at heart “once doctors are licensed to kill”? (Kass 35) Legalized euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide, however, does not have to destroy this trust. Instead, it may 
strengthen the relationship. Patients will feel confident that their physician will look after their 
wishes and respect their autonomy.  
Thus, it seems that, even taking some objections into account, there is a good case for the 
permissibility of euthanasia. In both the good and bad consequences, there seems to be a 
common theme that we desire a type of control, or autonomy, over our lives and decisions at the 
end of life. Making euthanasia permissible respects this desire for self-control and allows us a 
death with dignity while still upholding the relationship between physicians and their patients. In 
this way, it appears that, despite Kass’ fear that euthanasia will hinder the physician-patient 
relationship, there is a strong likelihood it could improve it. However, what does threaten this 
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relationship is the type of autonomy that is awarded to patients. Kass, himself, presents a good 
example of when this issue arises.  
 In his work, Kass describes a basic model of patient care that he refers to as a “consumer 
view.” As the name implies, this model treats patients as mere clients or consumers. Kass 
explains that this model used for patient care is one of contract between patient and physician. 
Essentially, the doctor “sells his services on demand” to the patient. (Kass 28) The basics of the 
relationship work so that the patient receives their autonomy accompanied by doctor’s services; 
the physician receives money as well as the satisfaction of assisting the patient. (Kass 28) Thus, 
nothing, save the law, constrains the physician from assisting his patient in any way they desire. 
For example, if a patient wants to change their nose, find out the sex of their baby, or take drugs 
for recreational purposes, a doctor can easily provide the services desired so long as the price is 
right and they are willing. This also extends to end of life situations. If patients have reached a 
point in their life where they decide euthanasia, in whatever capacity, is their desired action, then 
physicians can be “hired”, for the right price, to provide this service. This is particularly 
applicable in places that have laws allowing euthanasia because nothing is preventing doctors 
from providing this service to their patients upon request.  
However, despite this model’s apparent ability to respect a patient’s autonomy, it appears 
that it may be too relaxed in its ideas about autonomy to provide an appropriate view of the 
physician-patient relationship. This model seems to provide the patient with infinite freedom of 
autonomy. Thus, it is not the ability to obtain euthanasia that threatens the relationship; it is the 
definition of autonomy that is being employed. The patient has complete freedom of choice with 
no restrictions placed on them; they can request and receive any treatment they desire without 
the need or provision that they be fully informed. While this may seem desirable and appropriate 
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upon first glance, when the physician is restricted to following orders of the patient, especially 
when they are uninformed, not only does the relationship disintegrate, but the patient’s autonomy 
is inhibited to the point of interfering their well-being. Because of this, it is important to 
understand what autonomy is in relation to the physician-patient relationship; it cannot be seen 
separately without hindering both. Thus, finding the appropriate definition of autonomy requires 
an understanding of the physician-patient relationship and how the two work together.  
 In this way, the relationship between physicians and patients is not as straight forward as 
it may seem. We must find the appropriate model of care that also provides an adequate view of 
autonomy for patients while also maintaining a priority view of their well-being. This can be 
complicated because while physicians have the technical knowledge and know-how to treat 
patients, there must be a balance between the physician’s knowledge and the patient’s values. 
Finding this balance ensures that the patient is receiving the best medical advice and treatment 
possible while also maintaining full autonomy. To find this point of physician-patient 
interactions, there are different models which can be followed that help to determine not only 
how the physician interacts with the patient, but also the type and amount of autonomy the 
patient receives. In order to guarantee the proper type of autonomy is being employed, as well as 
to maximize the amount of autonomous freedom a patient receives, we must investigate different 
types of patient care to determine the appropriate physician-patient relationship. There are 
several different models that we can look at that will assist in defining an ideal of patient care 
that is sufficient for successful physician-patient interactions and patient autonomy. Linda and 
Ezekial Emanuel provide us with some such models.  
 Emanuel and Emanuel provide four examples of patient care that can be used to improve 
the view of autonomy provided by Kass’ model. Unlike Kass, the basic model in the work by 
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Emanuel and Emanuel is the paternalistic view. However, while I will briefly mention this later, 
this view, in general, is considered outdated and is typically assumed to be obsolete in regards to 
patient care; however, not only is it insufficient as a means for patient care, but it also completely 
fails to respect patients’ autonomy in an appropriate way. For this reason, the starting point of 
our analysis, using their models, will be with the informative view. This will provide us with a 
stepping point from Kass’ “consumer model” to a better, more successful view of autonomy and 
the physician-patient relationship.  
II. Informative Model 
The informative model of patient care is very similar to the consumer model in Kass’ 
work. Both models require the physician to take a “morally neutral” approach to patient care that 
puts all responsibility on the patient. (Kass 28) However, Ezekiel and Linda Emanuel describe 
the informative model in greater detail in the article Four Models of the Physician-Patient 
Relationship. According to this model, the physician-patient interaction is very technical. The 
physician will provide the patient with all relevant information on their diagnosis and possible 
treatments. The patient will then select the intervention he or she wants and the doctor will 
execute it. (Emanuel 2221) There is a very clear distinction between facts and values within this 
model; the values and beliefs of the physician have no place in the care of patients, nor is not 
necessary for the physician to have knowledge or understanding of the patient’s values. 
However, it is assumed that the patient’s values are clear, well-defined, and known to them. 
(Emanuel 2221) Thus, the physician is effectively relegated to a technical expert and nothing 
more; they only provide the patient with the capability needed to maintain control and autonomy 
over their medical decisions. (Emanuel 2221) Under this model of care, patient autonomy 
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consists of complete control over medical decisions with no interference from outside parties, 
including the physician.  
This view of autonomy and patient care is a major improvement from the outdated 
paternal model that was previously the norm. The Emanuel article explains that in the paternal 
model patients’ autonomy is of less emphasis then their overall well-being. In this method, then, 
the physician acts as the guardian and is tasked with ensuring the overall well-being of the 
patient is maintained. (Emanuel 2221)  Thus, the patient autonomy in this form is simply to 
consent to some objective value that is best for well-being. (Emanuel 2222) However, the 
informative model successfully provides a view of patient that care that better accounts for the 
values and needs of the patient. The patient is free to make their own decisions about health-care 
without feeling pressured by the paternalistic physician. This is an important point to note. As 
Thomas Hill notes, autonomy is a “right that every responsible person has…to make certain 
decisions for himself or herself without undue interference from others.” (47) In this sense, the 
informative model, unlike the paternalistic model, acknowledges that certain decisions are up to 
the patients and should be made without interference from others. (Hill 48) This seems to capture 
an important aspect of autonomy that the paternalistic model does not: that patients are self-
governed and able to make decisions independent of others opinions.  
This can be seen clearly in the work of Dr. Jack Kevorkian. In his work with euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide, he exemplified the informative model of patient care. Kevorkian 
became well-known because of his work in Michigan from the 1990s until his death in 2011. 
During this time, he assisted over 100 individuals in their deaths. To do this, he concocted a 
simple machine that allowed patients to painlessly end their lives using a combination of 
sedatives and lethal drugs administered through an IV line. However, in each of his cases, the 
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patients initiated the interactions once they decided death was their chosen treatment; no 
previous connection to Kevorkian was needed. Thus, Kevorkian had no established relationship 
with any of his patients past the brief meetings to schedule the time of “treatment”. He was 
essentially needed only for his technical, professional knowledge and skill set. In the framework 
of the informative model, the patients were exercising what appeared to be their full autonomy 
by choosing what they wanted and Kevorkian was simply the person who could implement their 
desired “treatment”.  In this way, Kevorkian was the perfect informative model physician 
because he did not interfere with his patients’ wishes or try to force objective values on them.  
However, even though the informative model makes huge strides in improving the 
physician-patient dynamic and allows the patient more freedoms in their health-care, there still 
appears to be something lacking in this view of autonomy. There are actually several major 
issues with viewing the informative model of patient care as providing adequate autonomy for 
patients. Namely, the concept of autonomy that is awarded to patients is at best lacking in its 
applications and, at worst, it is inhibiting to both patient and physician. It seems that there should 
be more to autonomy than simply allowing patients complete control. In these cases, physicians 
cannot ensure that their patient is receiving adequate and sufficient care. However, to really see 
the depth of the issue and determine what it is that is lacking in this model, we must relate the 
informative model of autonomy to the ideas of Harry Frankfurt. This will allow us to examine 
what this model looks like when applied to a real life situation and the problems will become 
more evident. Once this is done, we will have a better idea of what constitutes an appropriate 
view of autonomy. 
 Harry Frankfurt provides a good basis for the evaluation of the informative model of 
autonomy. In the first part of Frankfurt’s article Freedom of the Will and Concept of a Person, he 
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makes a distinction that is very important to our discussion of autonomy: the difference between 
first- and second-order desires. According to Frankfurt, a first-order desire is simply the “want” 
to do something. They apply to the physical world and our interactions with it. For example, we 
have basic desires and motives that drive us such as the desire to eat, the desire to exercise, the 
desire to smoke, or anything else. However, humans are different from other creatures in that we 
are capable of “wanting to be different, in [our] preferences and purposes, from what [we] are.” 
(Frankfurt 7) Thus, we are capable of reflective self-evaluation and wanting to change; we are 
capable of forming second-order desires. These desires, unlike first-order, apply to other desires. 
Thus, we are capable of wanting to desire (or not desire) something (i.e. desiring to not desire to 
smoke). (Frankfurt 6-7) However, this distinction alone, though a bit convoluted at times, is not 
enough to explain why the informative view of autonomy does not work. The problems are no 
more illuminated than before. To help better understand this distinction and the problems 
created, consider instances when a person’s first- and second-order desires conflict with one 
another. Frankfurt does this using his “addict scenarios”. 
Consider what he calls the “unwilling addict”. (Frankfurt 12) In this case, the addict has 
both the desire to take a drug and the desire to refrain. He struggles every day to refrain from the 
drug but eventually succumbs to his desire for it. As Frankfurt phrases it, “He is not neutral with 
regard to the conflict between his desires…” (12) This addict wants his desire to refrain from the 
drug to be successful, even when it is not, making him entirely unwilling in his addiction. This is 
a case where the first- and second-order desires are in conflict with one another and the person is 
a mess when it comes to the actions affected by these desires.  
Now consider this same situation applied to a patient making decisions concerning end of 
life care. According to the informative model, patients hold all control over their medical 
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decisions, which includes the assumption that their values and desires are well-defined and 
understood. However, this could cause major problems in the informative model of autonomy if 
their desires are conflicting, especially if this is not explicitly understood or known to the patient. 
The decisions being made would not be fully autonomous because the patient does not 
understand their values and desires.  
Imagine a patient; let’s call her Ann, who is diagnosed with terminal cancer. Ann may 
decide, after receiving all relevant information from her physician, that euthanasia or physician-
assisted suicide is her best option and chosen treatment. She feels it is best, given the small 
chance of survival, that she not suffers the pain caused by the cancer or burdens her family and 
so, she wants to end her life. However, she does not want to desire to die; actually, she wishes 
she wanted to live. This creates a conflict between what Ann desires (first-order) and what she 
wants to desire (second-order). Still, according to this first model, any decision Ann makes is 
completely within the scope of her autonomy because she has complete control over what 
treatment, if any, she wants to receive. Ann is assumed to have complete knowledge of her well-
defined desires. However, there seems to be an inherent issue with this if Ann, on one level, 
wants to die and, on another, does not.  
Consider, though, if Ann went to Dr. Kevorkian to implement her treatment: physician-
assisted suicide. Dr. Kevorkian, as an informative model physician, would not question Ann’s 
values or desires. In fact, he would not inquire about the nature of Ann’s desires or whether they 
were aligned, nor would he interfere with her choice with his own beliefs or opinions about her 
well-being. Instead, Dr. Kevorkian would provide Ann with the technical assistance she needed 
regardless of the state of her desires and the internal conflict caused by them. Ann would get 
exactly what she thinks she wants. Yet, there seems to be something that is not quite right about 
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this scenario. If Ann is acting with full autonomy of her actions, should she not know exactly 
what she wants and fully understand her desires? Because she is considering only first-order 
desires and not the relationship between her first- and second-order desires, any treatment she 
receives from Dr. Kevorkian, or any other doctor, may not be the best option for her, she is 
simply unable to see it. In this way, it seems that Ann is not exercising full autonomy, even 
though she is making her own decisions. Thus, it appears that simply having the ability to make a 
decision does not mean that one is fully autonomous, nor does it mean that one fully understands 
the desires leading to the decision. 
 So, with the help of this hypothetical scenario of Ann, the flaws of the informative model 
make themselves known. It seems that this first model of autonomy does not facilitate complete 
autonomy. Though the informative model is a much better option than the paternalistic approach, 
giving patients complete control over their medical decisions still does not demonstrate a full and 
comprehensive view of autonomy. When this idea is put in to practice, there are still areas where 
the informative model is lacking in its interpretation of patient autonomy. Harry Frankfurt’s 
insight on first- and second- order desires helps to illuminate exactly what is missing in the 
informative model of autonomy. Patients must fully understand both their first- and second- 
order desires, as well as how they align, in order to function autonomously. Accordingly, in 
order for patients to have a better view and understanding of autonomy, there must be a model 
that takes the patients desires, as well as the fact that they are not always understood, in to 
account. In this way, the interpretive model of patient care is a step closer to an appropriate view 
of autonomy. 
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III. Interpretive Model 
The next model of patient care that is presented by Emanuel and Emanuel improves upon 
the informative model. Similarly to the informative physician, the interpretive physician is 
responsible for providing the patient with all relevant information regarding their diagnosis and 
treatment. (Emanuel 2221) However, they go beyond simply providing the information and 
accepting the patient’s decision. Unlike the informative physician, the interpretive physician 
understands that the patient’s values are not always completely understood. In fact, their values 
are often undeveloped and conflicting; often, they are completely unrecognized by the patient. 
Because of this, the physician assists in “elucidating and articulating [the patient’s] values” as 
well as “determining what medical interventions best realize the specified values.” (Emanuel 
2222) Thus, in the interpretive model, the physician is not only the knowledgeable, technical 
expert presented by the informative physician; they also take on a role of advisor and counselor 
that is assisting the patient.   
In this model of patient care, physicians and patients work together to connect appropriate 
values with treatments for the patient based on their character and beliefs. To do this, often the 
physician must see the patient’s life as a whole from which they can specify certain values that 
are important to them and from this, determine what treatments are best suited to these specified 
values. However, it is ultimately the patient’s decision to accept certain values as their own and 
chose a treatment method. (Emanuel 2222) The physician is analogous to a counselor, helping 
the patient understand their values and putting them to appropriate use within the medical 
spectrum. Thus, in addition to the obligations of an informative physician to ensure the patient 
has all relevant information, the interpretive physician also engages the patient in understanding 
their values. (Emanuel 2222) 
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Including both physician and patient in this way, provides a better type of autonomy and 
patient care than before because of understanding of values that results. Thomas Hill notes: 
“The principles and values they try to express in their decisions would be genuine guiding 
considerations and not mere epiphenomena unrelated to their real moral motivation… moral 
agents face their moral choices with awareness of both the relevant feature of the problem and 
effective understanding of their real values.” (Hill 51)  
In this case, the moral agents would be equivalent to patients. Thus, in order to exercise 
full autonomy, according to the interpretive model and in Hill’s terms, one must be fully aware 
of the relevant information as well as have an effective understanding of their values. If this is 
done properly, it would appear that the patient is exercising full autonomy as well as keeping the 
physician-patient relationship intact. However, it must be noted that the physician does not revert 
to a paternalistic approach where they dictate to patient what values to hold and what decisions 
to make. While they are still not including their beliefs in any step of the process, they are also 
not judging what values and beliefs the patient chooses to hold. (Emanuel 2222) 
 To better understand how this model may work in a real situation. Take the same patient 
from earlier, Ann. She has been diagnosed with terminal cancer and her physician has provided 
her with all relevant information concerning her treatment options. However, Ann is having 
trouble deciding which treatment is best suited for her values and beliefs; in fact, she is not sure 
what her values would tell her to do. She wants to balance her physical well-being with her 
mental health as well as her personal life, but is unsure how to accomplish this. If she were to 
approach her physician, who practices the interpretive model of patient care, he would help her 
to clarify how values fit with the treatment options she is given and enable Ann to choose the 
most appropriate treatment option. He might say something along the lines of “I understand that 
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you are confused and have conflicting wishes about your treatment. It seems to me that you 
would like to balance your health and well-being with your personal life so that you maintain a 
positive attitude and self-image as well as regain your health. Given these conditions, treatment 
X will provide… treatment Y will provide… etc.” Thus, Ann would then take this new 
information and make her decision. In doing this, the physician provides assistance to the patient 
in understanding how the given treatment options apply to certain aspects of her values. 
However, he does not force a particular treatment or decision on her; he only provides 
clarification on how a certain treatment will apply to her values.  
 The interpretive model is even more clearly seen in the case of Dr. Timothy Quill and his 
patient Diane. In this particular case, Diane was diagnosed with a terminal type of leukemia. Dr. 
Quill presented her with the list of her treatment options and all relevant information including 
the fact that she had only a 25% chance of survival with treatment, she would spend a large 
amount of time in the hospital, and that without treatment her condition was decidedly terminal; 
action was needed quickly. Equipped with this information, Diane was faced with a decision: 
treatment or no treatment. Although she was relatively sure about what her values were, Diane 
still felt the need to discuss them with Dr. Quill. This meant that he helped to explain how her 
values lined up with her options, but he did not lead her to any one decision. In fact, in the end, 
even with a chance of survival and the desires of her family considered, the decision was Diane’s 
and she chose to forego treatment. Instead, she wanted to control how and when she died and 
requested a way to end her life when she chose to do so. Thus, Dr. Quill prescribed her 
medication that would allow her to do as she wished.  
 This example explains how the interpretive model of patient care works in a real clinical 
situation. Dr. Quill provided Diane with the information she needed as well as helped her align 
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her values with treatment. However, he did not coerce or force her in to any decisions; he merely 
ensured that she had a proper understanding of her values in relation to the treatment options and 
enacted the treatment she chose once she was fully informed. Thus, it appears that she was 
exercising full autonomy in her medical decisions. Because of this, this view seems to be a better 
model for patient care than that of the informative model. When the patient makes a decision 
with the help of the physician, they can have some assurance that their well-being is looked after 
by someone with the technical knowledge to know how to treat them properly.  
However, there may yet be some hidden issues with the interpretive model that need to be 
illuminated. While this model seems to completely alter the definition of patient autonomy, in 
reality it is not much different. Like in the informative model before, the patient still maintains 
full authority over their medical decisions and the physician remains the technical expert. The 
only difference is that the physician assists the patient in understanding their values. However, 
there is no room for the physician to include his or her own beliefs about the best options. The 
only new aspect of the physician’s role is to relate a particular treatment to a value held by the 
patient. This can lead to serious problems in the decision making process because the patient is 
relying on the physician to understand what they want and to help them understand how it relates 
to their options. Thus, the idea of responsibility enters into the equation. If the patient does not 
have clearly defined values and relies on the physician for clarification, can they be held 
responsible for their decisions? It would seem that in the interpretive model of autonomy and 
patient care, the responsibility of the patient is decidedly limited, but why?  
To understand how the notion of responsibility affects autonomy and the physician-patient 
relationship, we must first understand responsibility. Susan Wolf provides a basis for what 
responsibility entails in her article Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility. She pulls from 
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Charles Taylor’s ideas that “our freedom and responsibility depend on our ability to reflect on, 
criticize, and revise our selves... the ability to step back from ourselves and decide whether we 
are the selves we want to be.” (Wolf 365) Essentially, responsibility stems from our 
understanding of our desires and values as well as the ability to step back and reflect on them. 
However, if our values are unknown to us, as is the case with the interpretive model, we have no 
ability to reflect on or correct ourselves. This is strongly associated with Harry Frankfurt’s ideas 
about first- and second-order desires because, as we saw with the informative model, one must 
be in control of both his first- and second-order desires to be constituted as autonomous. (Wolf 
365) Unlike the informative model, values in the interpretive model may very well be aligned 
and in order, seemingly granting full autonomy; however, they are unknown to the patient, thus 
restricting autonomy. Responsibility cannot be a factor if the patient does not understand where 
the decision is coming from. 
However, Wolf takes this idea a step further. She states“…the key to responsibility lies in 
the fact that responsible agents are those for whom it is not just the case that their actions are 
within the control of their wills, but also the case that their wills are within the control of their 
selves…” (365) This is seemingly a reiteration of Frankfurt’s ideas about aligning desires. But 
what does this mean in relation to interpretive model autonomy? It is not enough to say that a 
patient has autonomy because they are in control of their decisions or making informed 
decisions. Autonomy must provide that the patient makes decisions based on a sound 
understanding of their values in relation to the information they have been provided. However, 
Wolf also makes the point that simply understanding your values is not enough to guarantee that 
a patient is exercising full autonomy; the sanity of the patient must also be considered. By this 
Wolf means that there can be cases when a patient’s first- and second-order desires are 
23 
 
completely aligned and understood by the patient, but their desires are not entirely sane or 
rational. This can be understood as the ability of a person to (1) know what he/she is doing and 
(2) know that what he/she is doing is right or wrong. (Wolf 368) What is more, sanity can be 
defined as the “minimally sufficient ability cognitively and normatively to recognize and 
appreciate the world for what it is.” (Wolf 369)  
This idea of a responsible and sane person is illustrated by Wolf’s example of JoJo the 
dictator. JoJo was raised by his evil and sadistic father who provided him with a special 
education, allows him to accompany him during his daily routine, and treated him as the favorite 
son. Because of this, JoJo took on the beliefs and values of his father, and once he assumes 
power, he acts much like his father before him. He knows exactly what his desires are and what 
he wants to do. (Wolf 367-8) However, his judgement is skewed from reality; he is not able to 
see whether his actions and desires are right or wrong because of his upbringing. In this sense, 
JoJo is insane. Thus, he cannot be counted as a responsible agent. (Wolf 368) 
In relation to euthanasia, the idea of responsibility and sanity is crucial to the decision 
making process. Imagine if Ann, with the same diagnosis as before, was completely firm in what 
her values are and the treatment she desires: euthanasia. This seems like an autonomous decision. 
However, Ann is severely depressed as a result of her diagnosis. Because of this, the physician 
may refer Ann to a psychiatrist to determine if her state of mind is sufficient to make decisions 
about her health. (This is often a requirement for cases in Oregon, for example, where euthanasia 
is legal.) Thus, because Ann is depressed, she is much like JoJo with his skewed view of reality. 
She is unable to understand the full weight of her decisions and she is making them from a 
distorted view of her reality, and so, cannot be held fully responsible for the decisions she makes. 
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This also means that despite the appearance of full autonomy from within the interpretive model, 
Ann actually has a very limited autonomy.  
Unfortunately, this is often seen in the interpretive view. Whether the patient lacks a 
proper understanding of their values or has a complete understanding, the interpretive model 
lacks the consideration of the patient’s sanity in its definition of patient autonomy and patient 
care. In order to have an effective relationship between physician and patient, the model of care 
must provide that the physician can not only assist the patient in understanding the relationship 
between their values and treatment options but also that the patient is making their decisions 
from a sane mindset. This remains unaccomplished in the interpretive model. Thus, a third model 
of the patient care is needed that can capture the needed aspects of autonomy and the physician-
patient relationship while ensuring that patients well-being is priority. 
IV. Deliberative Model 
The final model of patient care that is presented by Emanuel and Emanuel is that of the 
deliberative physician. This model builds on the previous two while simultaneously improving 
both autonomy and the relationship between physician and patient. Essentially, within the 
deliberative model, the aim of the physician-patient relationship is to choose “the best health-
related values that can be realized in the clinical situation.” (Emanuel 2222) To make this 
possible, though, both the physician’s role and the concept of the patient’s autonomy must 
change. Thus, while the physician’s role includes many of the same qualities as the previous two 
models, there are also some key differences that distinguish the deliberative model of patient 
care from others. These differences can be seen in both the role the physician assumes and the 
conception of the patient’s autonomy.  
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In this model of patient care, the physician assumes a role that is similar to a friend or 
teacher who assists the patient in making decisions as well as implementing treatment. (Emanuel 
2222) As such, the physician must take on the responsibility of articulating to the patient which 
health-related values are most admirable and attainable from within a set of accepted and 
understood values. In this way, the physician engages in deliberation with the patient to 
determine which values they could, and should, hold in regards to their health. This process of 
deliberation can be thought of as a “process in which [the physician and patient] attempt jointly 
to establish a set of practical reasons that will serve as a basis for shared intention, action, and 
further deliberation.” (Westlund 68) However, it is important to note that the discussion between 
physician and patient includes only “values that affect or are affected by the patient’s disease and 
treatments.” (Emanuel 2222) To this end, the physician must help the patient understand which 
values are most beneficial and relatable to their health, while simultaneously refraining from 
coercing them into a decision; at the most, there is a level of persuasion on the part of the 
physician to convince the patient of the importance of certain values or treatments. However, the 
patient remains in control of the final decision and must ultimately define their values for 
themselves before choosing a treatment; their focus should be on “moral self-development.” 
(Emanuel 2222)  
However, unlike the interpretive model, this model of patient care ensures that the patient 
is sane and capable of taking responsibility for their decisions. In her article Autonomy in 
Relation, Andrea Westlund states: “…many distinctly human capacities, including the capacity 
for responsible action, could not come to be but for the long, slow process of maturation during 
which human young remain dependent on their elders.” (59) Aside from the fact this statement is 
obviously not referring to patient care or the physician-patient relationship, there are some 
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important parallels to patient autonomy. She continues by saying that “autonomy itself must be 
understood in a relational capacity.” (Westlund 59) This is what is accomplished in the 
deliberative model: patient autonomy is viewed in more relational terms than previous models. 
But how exactly is a social aspect supposed to be incorporated into autonomy? We can look to 
Westlund for the answer. 
In her article, Westlund approaches the “concept of answerability” to provide a solution 
to the problem of an understanding of autonomy that is both self-governing and social. (65) In its 
most basic form, answerability means that a patient is capable of providing rational and sane 
reasons for their decisions. This builds on Susan Wolf’s idea of sanity and responsibility that is 
considered in the informative model. Not only do patients have to be sane when making 
decisions, meaning they know what they are doing and know whether it is right or wrong, (Wolf 
369) but they also have to be able to provide rational reasons for what they are doing. Meaning 
that, when asked, patients should be ready and able to provide coherent, sensible reasons for the 
decisions they make regarding their treatment. If they can meet each of these conditions, then it 
follows that they are answerable for their decisions and actions. 
To better understand this idea of answerability, imagine the depressed patient from 
before. In the informative model, the physician was able to refer the patient to a psychiatrist who 
determined that they were lacking in their ability to make a sane decision. However, there is 
more to be said on this issue. There is a great possibility that the depressed person completely 
understands the decision they are making, but they are not seeing the true reality; at best, their 
capacities for seeing rational reasons and acting upon them is diminished. Thus, in these cases 
we usually say that they are not entirely answerable for their actions because the depression is 
limiting their ability to provide rational reasons for their action that are their own. We may say 
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something along the lines of “That is not Aunt Jane talking; it is the depression.” This is the 
concept of answerability. Because they are not able to consistently recognize and act upon 
rational reason, they are not seen as answerable and are not held entirely responsible for their 
actions. Therefore, the patient must not only understand all relevant information on their 
condition and options, but also be capable of making a sane decision in which rational reasons 
can be provided as support.  
However, this answerability is not only to the patients themselves, but to others around 
them as well. According to Westlund, “autonomy requires a disposition to hold oneself 
answerable to external, critical perspectives on one’s motives and desires…” (65) Thus, when 
patients make seemingly autonomous decisions, they must be able to rationally justify these 
decisions with reason to anyone who asks, especially physicians. In order to ensure this is the 
case, deliberative physicians engage the patients in deliberation and discussion regarding their 
values, options, and decisions. This is because “the kind of reflectiveness [autonomy] requires of 
the agent is itself dialogical in form…” (Westlund 65)  Thus, dialogue and discussion ensures 
that the patient is sane, rational, and responsible for their action which in turn ensures that the 
patient is fully autonomous in their decision. 
Answerability in this type of social situation provides that the patient is making a 
decision that is truly theirs, not the influence or decisions of an outside agent. With the 
knowledge and understanding that there are numerous ways in which patients can be influenced 
(family, friends, society, physicians, etc.), they must be able to take these outside considerations 
and apply them to their own values before making a decision. If this is done incorrectly, the 
reasons behind patient decisions could become the decisions of others. Examples of this include: 
“My mom wants this treatment for me”, “My friend Suzy said this would be best”, “I couldn’t 
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decide so I just picked one”. These are only a few responses that could result from ineffective 
social deliberation. However, requiring that a patient be held answerable for their decisions will 
help to ensure that these situations do not occur and the reasons for certain choices are grounded 
in the patient’s own desire and rational beliefs about them.  
To see this in action, we can go back to the example of Ann. Recall that Ann was 
diagnosed with a terminal form of cancer and has been given all of the relevant information 
pertaining to her treatment options. In this case, if her physician practiced the deliberative model, 
he would engage Ann in a discussion that begins similarly to the previous model. He would 
outline her diagnosis and treatment options, then assist her in understanding how certain values 
align with the different treatments. However, he would then continue by pointing out which 
treatment option would be most beneficial considering the values and options available. In this 
way, Ann’s physician would try to persuade her to accept the treatment option that is seen as 
most beneficial for her health. However, it is ultimately in Ann’s power to choose the treatment 
option she prefers and accept one set of values or another in regards to her health-care.  
Thus, it appears that the deliberative model is able to most effectively provide patients 
with an appropriate freedom of autonomy while also ensuring that the physician-patient 
relationship is intact. It builds on the ideas of the previous models but includes important 
changes that are imperative to a working view of autonomy. Like so, the autonomy of patients is 
such that through deliberation with physicians, and provided they are sane, rational, and able to 
offer reasons, they are in control of their medical decisions and health-care. Physicians, on the 
other hand, are able to ensure that their patients’ well-being is of top priority.  
What is important to note though is the fact that this model sets very high standards for 
the patient as well as the physician. These standards and ideals are often unrealistic in their 
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perfect attainability. Because of this, the model of patient care that is practically practiced may in 
fact deviate from this model’s often unattainable ideals. However, using the model of Oregon’s 
established laws as a reference, it may be possible to set up a system or procedure that a patient 
must complete before they are considered to have met the deliberative requirements. In doing 
this, the goals set forth by the deliberative model are obtained to the best of our ability, 
considering the limitations on processes such as measuring the sanity of an individual. Thus, 
with this in mind, the deliberative model provides the best model on which to base such a 
process. 
V. Conclusion 
The importance of autonomy in the patient care, and the physician-patient relationship in 
general, is undeniably important, especially when dealing with end-of-life decisions. In order for 
this relationship to function properly, a model of patient care must be found that will provide 
adequate patient care while also providing appropriate autonomy for the patient. Each of the 
models previously discussed attempts to do this but is distinctly different in their approach to 
patient autonomy and its role the overall physician-patient dynamic. It is important to understand 
the benefits and drawbacks of each model to properly assess which is best suited for generally 
use.  
Accordingly, in regards to cases of euthanasia and general end-of-life decisions, the 
importance of a working physician-patient relationship is crucial. Considering the growing 
acceptance of the permissibility of euthanasia in places like Oregon, ensuring that patient 
autonomy provides an appropriate amount of freedom without inhibiting patient well-being or 
their relationship with physicians is equally as important. An inadequate view of autonomy could 
not only be hindering the efficiency of this relationship, but it could also put the patient’s well-
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being in danger. For this reason, the different models of patient care have to be compared side by 
side to determine which is the most fitting.  
Thus, through comparison of their different characteristics, it seems that the deliberative 
model provides the most adequate and complete view of patient care. While the informative and 
interpretive models have areas where their benefits are numerous, there are several areas in 
which they lack important aspects of an appropriate model of patient care such as a clear 
understanding of values, a standard of responsibility, and conditions of sanity. However, the 
deliberative model of patient care ensures each of these conditions is met and adds that the 
patient must be capable of providing rational reasons that of their own making for their decisions 
before being considered autonomous. Because of this, it appears the physician-patient 
relationship is best viewed through the deliberative model of patient care. This will guarantee 
that any decisions a patient makes concerning their medical care, especially in regards to end-of-
life situations, can be viewed as autonomous and free under the physician-patient relationship.   
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VIII. Appendix: A Chemical Look at Secobarbital 
Since the creation of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act in 1997, over 1,300 
prescriptions have been written, and over 850 patients have died as a result of these prescription 
drugs. (Varadarajan et al. 8) More than 80 percent of these deaths were the result of prescriptions 
for an oral dose of barbiturates, most commonly secobarbital. (Varadarajan et al. 14) This short-
acting drug works by “suppressing…activity in the cortex, thalamus, and limbic systems.” 
(“Secobarbital”, 2013) Like all barbiturates, secobarbital is a central nervous system (CNS) 
depressant; this effect is nonselective throughout the CNS due to the decrease in the excitability 
of chemicals within the brain. Not only does this provide sedative and hypnotic effects, but in 
higher doses it can also protect the brain from intracranial pressure. Because of this, the drug can 
occasionally be used as a treatment for insomnia, though it becomes less effective is used longer 
than two weeks. (“Secobarbital”, 2013) More pertinent to this discussion, though, are the 
applications secobarbital has in regards to euthanasia.  
Secobarbital is useful as an aid in physician-assisted suicide because of the speed it is 
absorbed into the body.  In relation to other barbiturates, secobarbital has the highest lipid 
solubility, allowing it to be absorbed into the body faster than other similar barbiturates such as 
phenobarbital. (“Secobarbital”, 2013) This difference in lipid solubility is the result of 
differences in the substituents to the barbituric acid base structure. These differences in structure 
can be seen in figure one below where (a) displays the original barbituric acid structure with (b) 
and (c) displaying the different structures substituted to the five position of the ring structure.  
 
(a)        (b)       (c) 
Figure 1. (a) Structure of barbituric acid. (b) Structure of Secobarbital. (c) Structure of phenobarbital 
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The lipid solubility is determined by the specific substituent that is attached at the five position 
of the barbituric acid ring. In the case of phenobarbital (c), this substituent is a phenyl group with 
an ethyl group. (DeRuiter 2004) This combination causes the compound to have low lipophilicity 
in general because it has a more polar nature than other substituents (although it is still slightly 
non-polar).  This, in turn, means that the compound does not readily or easily cross cell 
membranes and the brain barrier. However, secobarbital (b), which is substituted with both an 
allyl and a five-carbon chain, is more lipophilic. (DeRuiter 2004) Contrary to phenobarbital, the 
substituents of secobarbital are more non-polar which allows them to readily cross cell 
membranes and the brain barrier easier.  
 Thus, because of its lipophilic substituents, secobarbital has an onset of only 10 to 15 
minutes (DeRuiter 2004) because it absorbs into the lipophilic cells more rapidly. This is 
compared to the onset of phenobarbital, which is 30 to 60 minutes (DeRuiter 2004) because of its 
inability to easily cross membranes. Secobarbital, then, is the more useful of the two in terms of 
speed of absorption. In fact, literature states that approximately 90 percent of secobarbital is 
absorbed from the gastrointestinal tract within two hours of consumption. This time can be 
increased if the drug is taken on an empty stomach because of the time required for gastric 
emptying is decreased and the drug moves through the body faster. Regardless, the peak plasma 
concentrations within the blood are reached in as little as two hours, with the effects of the drug 
being felt only ten minutes after consumption. (“Secobarbital”, 2013) A blood plasma 
concentration as little as five mcg/ml can result in sedation, but concentrations greater than ten 
mcg/ml can result in coma and concentrations greater than 30 mcg/ml are lethal. In doses of this 
size, secobarbital induces death by decreasing cardiac output and causing respiratory arrest in the 
patient due to the severe depression of the CNS. (Varadarajan et al. 15) Thus, secobarbital is 
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capable of producing sedative effects, even death, quickly and painlessly while requiring 
relatively small doses.  
These affects can be seen in real cases of patient death. One such case is described in the 
article “Suicide by injection of veterinarian barbiturate euthanasia agent: a report of a case and 
toxicological analysis”. Essentially, a 51 year-old man was injected with ten ml of pentobarbital, 
a barbiturate remarkably close to secobarbital; this injection resulted in the death of said 
individual. (Romain et al. 104) Upon analysis of “blood, urine and gastric contents” using two 
different analytical techniques, gas chromatography-mass spectrometry and high-performance 
liquid-chromatography, it was found that all samples showed presence of pentobarbital in high 
concentrations (21.7 mcg/ml). (Romain et al. 104-105) Unlike typical cases, this study 
investigated the use of veterinary grade barbiturates which are more concentrated than typical 
prescriptions. However, the basic principles stand: the barbiturates suppress the CNS and induce 
cardiac and respiratory distress while the patient is sedated.  
There are, however, risks associated with barbiturates and secobarbital in particular. 
Several side effects are related to this drug, especially when it is used on a regular basis as a 
sleep aid. For example, blurred vision, dizziness, and dependency are common ones. However, 
there are others that are rare but more serious. Because of the amount of secobarbital that is 
metabolized in the liver, the possibility of it interfering with hepatic mechanisms is large. 
(“Secobarbital”, 2013) It also increases the metabolism of vitamins with the body so that the 
activity of Vitamin D and its analogs is decreased. (“Secobarbital”, 2013) 
However, despite a long list of risks and adverse effects associated with secobarbital, it 
remains a prominent prescription drug in physician-assisted suicide. This is essentially because 
of its high, fast absorbance rate within the body and the relatively low dosage that is required for 
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effectiveness. Through depression of the central nervous system, secobarbital is able to sedate a 
patient in to a comatose state before death occurs. Thus, its prevalence in the world of physician-
assisted suicide is the result of the chemical effects secobarbital has on the body, seemingly 
resulting in the decrease in the amount of suffering experienced by the patient.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
